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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of changes in public employment on private sector activity
using the creation of the new West German government in Bonn in the wake of the Second World
War as a source of exogenous variation. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple
economic geography model in which public sector employment aects private sector employment
through its impact on wages and house prices and also through potential productivity and amenity
spillovers to the private sector. We nd that relative to a control group of cities, Bonn experiences
a substantial increase in public employment. However, this results in only modest increases in
private sector employment with each additional public sector job destroying around 0.2 jobs in
industry and creating just over one additional job in other parts of the private sector. We show
how our model can explain this nding and provide several pieces of evidence for the mechanisms
emphasized by the model.
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1 Introduction
Following Krugman (1991), there has been a wave of research investigating the spatial distribution
of economic activity. By and large, this literature has concentrated on the location choices of rms
and workers in the private sector. However, in most advanced economies, a substantial share of the
workforce is employed in the public sector.1 This is important for at least two reasons. First, the spatial
distribution of public employment is unlikely to be determined exclusively by market forces. Indeed,
many governments use public employment as a form of regional policy and create public sector jobs in
economically lagging regions.2 Second, the distribution of public employment across locations should
have important impacts on the location of private sector activity through its general equilibrium impact
on wages and house prices and also through potential productivity and amenity spillovers from the
public to the private sector.
In this paper we use the creation of the West German government in Bonn in the wake of the Second
World War as a source of exogenous variation to evaluate the causal impact of public employment on
the spatial distribution of private sector activity. This approach has a number of attractive features.
First, the arrival of the federal government in Bonn was a large and plausibly exogenous shock to
public employment, which was driven by factors that are unrelated to the local economic performance
of Bonn. Second, we are able to follow the impact of this shock over several decades, which allows
us to capture the long-run general equilibrium response to this shock. Third, we are able to provide a
number of pieces of evidence on the mechanisms through which public and private sector employment
interact.
To guide our empirical analysis we develop a simple theoretical model which builds on Helpman
(1998) and Redding and Sturm (2008). In the model both private sector rms and the public sector
demand labor across dierent cities. The public sector produces a global public good which enters the
utility of all workers in the economy equally. The private sector consists of both a tradable and non-
tradable sector. Firms in the tradable sector produce manufacturing varieties that are tradable across
cities at some cost, while varieties produced by rms in the non-tradable sector can only be consumed
locally. In the model the location of public employment aects the location choices of private sector
workers through its impact on wages and house prices and also through potential productivity and
amenity spillovers to the private sector.
Using panel data for Bonn and 40 control cities covering the period from 1925 to 1987, we examine
the predictions of our model. The 40 control cities are the 20 cities ranked just above and just be-
low Bonn in terms of total 1939 population. We employ both a dierence-in-dierences comparison
1OECD (2009) reports that the share of public employment across OECD countries in 2005 ranges from highs close to
30% in Sweden and Norway to lows of less than 10% in Switzerland, Korea and Japan with an OECD average in 2005 of
14.4%. In many countries, public employment is higher than employment in industry.
2 Alesina, Danninger, and Rostagno (2001), for example, argue that in Italy public employment is mostly used as a
re-distributive device from the richer North to the poorer South.
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between Bonn and the control cities and also construct a synthetic control city for Bonn using the
40 control cities as the donor pool. Both approaches yield similar results and show that the substan-
tial increase in public employment in Bonn has only resulted in modest increases in private sector
employment. In particular, translating the estimated treatment eects from comparing Bonn to its
synthetic control into employment multipliers we nd that each additional public sector job reduces
employment in industry by around 0.2 jobs and creates just over one additional job in other parts of
the private sector.
We next show how this nding can be explained by our model and provide several pieces of evi-
dence for the mechanisms emphasized by the model. First, we provide some suggestive direct evidence
for the amenity and productivity spillovers from public to private employment that the model postu-
lates. These results suggest that there could be amenity spillovers from public employment in Bonn,
but there is little evidence for productivity spillovers. Second, we use data on wages and house prices
to show that house prices are positively related to city size, as suggested by the model, while the ex-
pansion of public employment only had very small eects on nominal wages in Bonn by 1987. Third,
we undertake a simple quantitative analysis of the model to explore the parameter values for which
the model can best t the reduced form evidence. The quantitative analysis suggests that the increase
in public employment has generated sizable amenity spillovers and if anything marginally negative
productivity spillovers, which reinforces the reduced form evidence on mechanisms.
Our paper contributes to a number of literatures. The idea that expansions in employment in a
tradable sector can have multiplier eects on employment in other sectors in the same location has
a long history, with early contributions by Daly (1940), Hildebrand and Mace (1950) and Thompson
(1959) (see Richardson (1985) for a survey of this early work). The early literature in this area uses
simple cross-sectional correlations or input-output approaches to estimate multipliers and struggles
to isolate plausibly exogenous variation. To overcome these problems, Carrington (1996) uses the
exogenous shock to employment caused by the construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline between
1974 and 1977 on other parts of the Alaskan labor market. Similarly, Black, McKinnish, and Sanders
(2005) analyze the eect of the coal boom in the 1970s and the subsequent coal bust in the 1980s
as an exogenous shock and estimate that each additional mining job created 0.17 non-tradable jobs,
while the loss of a mining job implies a loss of 0.34 non-tradable jobs. Moretti (2010) uses a shift-
share instrument to isolate exogenous variation in manufacturing employment across US cities. He
estimates that an additional job in the tradable sector of a US city creates 1.6 additional jobs in the
city’s non-tradable sector, with a larger multiplier eect for additional skilled jobs. Recently, Feyrer,
Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) use the drilling of new wells during the US fracking boom to examine
the spatial and sectoral dispersion of this shock.
While governments have some policy instruments to inuence the spatial distribution of manufac-
turing and other tradable employment, they have direct control over the location of public employment
and regularly use increases in public employment to support lagging regions. Surprisingly, there is
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little systematic evidence on the spillover eects of changes in the spatial distribution of public em-
ployment on the private sector. An important exception is Faggio and Overman (2014) who use a
shift-share instrument to isolate exogenous variation in public employment across 325 UK local au-
thorities covering the period 2003 to 2007. They nd that increases in public sector employment have a
small but statistically insignicant positive eect on overall private sector employment. Furthermore,
they show that this overall eect can be decomposed into a decrease in employment in industry and
increases in employment in non-tradable sectors.
Several papers have recently extended the work of Faggio and Overman (2014). Faggio (2019) uses a
dierence-in-dierences approach on data covering 2003-2008 to evaluate relocations of public sector
employment from London recommended by the Lyons Review, nding broadly similar results to Faggio
and Overman (2014). Faggio, Schlüter, and vom Berge (2018) investigate whether the opening of federal
ministries in Berlin in 1999 has resulted in faster private sector job creation in postcodes of Berlin that
received a federal ministry relative to postcodes in other parts of Berlin. Auricchio, Ciani, Dalmazzo,
and de Blasio (2020) use a shift-share instrument similar to Faggio and Overman (2014) to estimate
the eect of changes in public employment on private employment across Italian municipalities using
data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. Jofre-Monseny, Silva, and VÃązquez-Grenno (2020) simulate
the impact of public on private employment in a search and matching model and also show reduced
form evidence using Spanish data for 1980, 1990 and 2001. Our approach diers from Faggio and
Overman (2014) and the subsequent literature in three main ways. First, we use a dierent source of
plausibly exogenous variation that comes from a large scale natural experiment to estimate the impact
of changes in public employment on the private sector. Second, we are able to observe the impact of
this change in public employment over several decades. Third, we develop a simple theoretical model
which can be calibrated to the reduced form evidence to shed light on the mechanisms through which
public and private employment interact.3,4
Our paper is also related to the wider literature following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) that
examines amenity and productivity dierences across locations. See, for example, Albouy and Lue
(2015) for a recent contribution. While much of this literature has considered exogenous dierences
in amenities, many urban amenities are plausibly endogenously determined, as in Glaeser, Kolko, and
Saiz (2001), Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2015) and Diamond (2016). We show that public em-
ployment is potentially an important channel of local amenity dierences across cities. We also con-
tribute to the wider literature on local labor market shocks. One strand of this literature investigates
the impact of closures of military bases on local economic outcomes (see, for example, aus dem Moore
3 Boeri, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2000) and Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002) use panel data across a small set of
OECD countries to estimate the impact of higher public employment on private employment at the country level. Although
interesting, these estimates do not fully take into account adding-up constraints, or fully resolve the endogeneity problems
surrounding public employment.
4 A further related literature uses spatial variation to provide new estimates of the government spending multiplier.
See Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) for recent contributions.
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and Spitz-Oener (2012) for evidence from Germany and Moretti (2011) for a recent survey). Finally,
there is a growing literature that evaluates the eects of place-based policies. Recent contributions to
this literature include Kline and Busso (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2014) (see, Neumark and Simpson
(2015) for a recent survey).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a simple theoretical
framework to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides some historical background. Section 4
describes our data and Section 5 our empirical strategy. Section 6 presents our main empirical nd-
ings. Section 7 provides evidence for the mechanisms through which public and private employment
interact. Section 8 puts our ndings into perspective and draws out some implications, and the nal
section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple economic geography model in which both private sector rms and a public sector
employ workers. The model builds on Helpman (1998) and Redding and Sturm (2008). The main
building blocks of the model are developed in this section and a more detailed exposition of the model
is contained in Section A of the technical appendix. In the model, monopolistically competitive private
sector rms produce varieties of either a tradable or non-tradable good. Workers are mobile across
locations and are in equilibrium indierent across locations. The key novel feature of the model is
the presence of a public sector that employs workers and produces a global public good. We treat the
distribution of public sector jobs across locations as a policy parameter.
The key contribution of our model is that it highlights the dierent channels through which public
and private employment interact in a spatial setting. It shows how public sector employment aects
private sector employment through its impact on wages and house prices and also through potential
productivity and amenity spillovers to the private sector. We use our reduced form evidence and a
calibration of the model to shed light on the relative strength of these dierent mechanisms.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
The economy consists of a number of locations, which we refer to as cities. The economy is populated
by a mass of representative workers,L, who are mobile across cities and are endowed with a single unit
of labor which is supplied inelastically with zero disutility in the city in which the worker resides.5
Utility is dened over a consumption index of tradable varieties, CTc , a consumption index of non-
tradable varieties, CNc , consumption of housing, CHc , and the amenity level of the city, Bc.6 The upper
5 It would not be dicult to extend the model to also include non-working dependents for each worker.
6 We use both c and i to index cities. When the distinction is important, we use c to indicate a city when it is consuming
and i to indicate a city when it is producing.
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level utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
Uc = Bc
(
CTc
)µ (
CNc
)θ (
CHc
)1−µ−θ
. (1)
There are iceberg transport costs for tradable varieties between locations and for one unit of a variety
produced in city i to arrive in city c, a quantity τic > 1 must be shipped. In contrast, non-tradable
varieties can only be consumed in the city in which they have been produced.
The tradables consumption index takes the standard CES (Dixit-Stiglitz) form. The dual tradables
price index is as follows:
P Tc =
[∑
i
nTi (p
T
i τic)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
, (2)
which uses the fact that all nTi tradable varieties produced in city i face the same elasticity of demand
and charge the same equilibrium price pTic = τic pTi to consumers in city c. The price index implies
that higher prices in cities i or higher transport costs between cities i and c result in a higher tradables
price index in city c. In contrast, non-tradable varieties can only be consumed in the city in which
they are produced. Hence the non-tradable price index in city c is:
PNc =
[
nNc (p
N
c )
1−σ]1/(1−σ) = pNc
(
nNc
)1/(1−σ)
, (3)
which depends on the number of non-traded varieties produced in the city, nNc , and their equilibrium
price, pNc , and where we have used the fact that all non-tradable varieties in a city charge the same
equilibrium price.
Both tradable and non-tradable varieties are produced by monopolistically competitive rms using
the same production technology. In particular, rms have a xed cost in terms of labor of producing
varieties, F > 0, and a constant variable cost. The total amount of labor, l, required to produce x units
of a variety is:
l = F +
x
ϕi
, (4)
where ϕi captures the productivity of rms in city i. Firms maximize prots, ignoring their eect on
the price index.7 This yields the standard result that the equilibrium free on board price of varieties is
a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
pi =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
wi
ϕi
, (5)
where σ is the price elasticity of demand, which is the same for tradable and non-tradable varieties.
7In line with the economic geography literature we assume that rms do not use land or housing as a factor of produc-
tion. Adding housing to the production function of rms in our model would have the same eect as an increase in the
share of expenditure on housing by consumers as the model assumes that workers have to live in the city in which they
work.
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Instead of modeling a construction sector that provides housing we assume a simple housing supply
function that relates house prices to the level of employment in a city:
PHc = (Lc)
γ, (6)
where γ is the elasticity of house prices with respect to employment in the city.8 We assume that
expenditure on housing in city c, which is a constant share of city c income, is redistributed to the
residents of city c through lump-sum transfers.
2.2 Public Sector
The public sector produces a global public good (e.g. defense) that aects all agents in the economy
equally independent of their location. Without loss of generality, we normalize the utility that agents
derive from this public good to zero. We assume for simplicity that the total number of public sector
workers in the economy is constant. The key policy decision is the distribution of public employment
across cities where LGi is the number of public sector workers in city i.9 Public sector workers in city
i are paid a wage wGi that we assume to be equal to the wage wi that private sector workers in city i
receive.10 To nance public employment, the government levies a at income tax t on the wage income
of both public and private sector workers to exactly satisfy the government budget constraint:
t
∑
i
(wiLi) =
∑
i
(wiL
G
i ). (7)
We assume that public sector employment in a city generates two potential spillovers to private
sector workers in both the tradable and non-tradable sector in the same city. First, productivity of
private sector workers in city i is:
ϕi = ξi(L
G
i )
α, (8)
where ξi captures sources of productivity other than public employment and α is the elasticity of the
productivity of private sector rms in city iwith respect to the size of the public sector in this city. This
general specication for productivity spillovers from public employment to the private sector captures
a range of mechanisms. On the one hand, there could be classical knowledge spillovers with private
sector rms being more productive because they learn, for example, about new policy initiatives. On
the other hand, purchases of the public sector from local rms could boost local demand, which is
observationally equivalent to a positive productivity shock.
8Saiz (2010) provides a micro-foundation for this housing supply function.
9 In the model it is equivalent whether the public sector creates job openings in a particular city, or whether the public
sector has a dedicated workforce that can be moved between cities.
10 It would not be dicult to extend the model so that the public sector pays a higher wage than private sector rms
and public sector employment is rationed in equilibrium. This would marginally change the quantitative implications of
our model but not the qualitative insights.
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Similarly, we assume that consumption amenities in city i are determined by:
Bc = ψi(L
G
c )
δ, (9)
where ψi captures determinants of amenities other than public employment and δ is the elasticity of
city amenities with respect to the size of the public sector.11 Similar to productivity spillovers, our
formulation of amenity spillovers could capture a number of dierent mechanisms. On the one hand,
public sector workers could, for example, help to improve local schools or other local public goods.
On the other hand, public sector workers might be able to divert a disproportionate share of national
public spending to locations with larger concentrations of public employment.
2.3 Spatial Equilibrium
We assume that workers are freely mobile across cities and arbitrage away all utility dierences across
cities in the long run. Substituting the equilibrium demand functions into the utility function (1), equal
utility across cities implies:
wcBc
(P Tc )
µ (PNc )
θ (PHc )
1−µ−θ = k for all c, (10)
where we implicitly assume that all cities are populated in equilibrium. The intuition behind (10) is
that higher wages or higher amenities make a city more attractive. At the same time higher housing
costs or a higher price of tradable or non-tradable varieties make a city less attractive. In a spatial
equilibrium, these opposing forces have to just oset each other so that utility is equalized across
cities.
An alternative assumption to the free population mobility embodied in (10) would be to allow
workers to have heterogeneous preferences across locations as in Redding (2016). In the presence of
such heterogeneous location preferences, cities face an upward sloping labor supply curve rather than
the perfectly elastic supply of labor implied by (10). As we study changes over four decades and federal
ministries tend to recruit workers from across the country, we think that assuming perfect mobility of
workers is a reasonable approximation and we return to the implications of relaxing this assumption
in Section 2.4.
2.4 Simulation
We simulate the impact of changes in the location of public employment on the equilibrium distribution
of private sector employment in a two-city version of our model. In particular we start with two ex-
ante identical cities and explore the impact of changes in the location of public employment across
11When we compare Bonn to its synthetic control it is plausible to assume that other determinants of productivity, ξi,
and amenities, ψi in equations (8) and (9) do not vary between Bonn and its synthetic control. We therefore assume that
ξi and ψi are the same across cities when we simulate the model in Section 2.4 and undertake our quantitative analysis of
the model in Section 7.5.
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the two cities, holding the overall level of public sector employment in the economy constant. For
this simulation we assume central values for the key parameters of the model. First, we assume an
elasticity of substitution (σ) of 5 which is similar to the values typically used in the international trade
literature (see, for example, Feenstra (1994); Ghironi and Melitz (2005)). Second, we set the share of
expenditure on housing in total expenditure (1 − µ − θ) to 1/3, which is somewhat larger than the
housing expenditure share of around 0.25 estimated by Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) for the US.
Third, we set the share of public employment in total employment to 12%, which is the average level
of pre-treatment public employment in Bonn and its synthetic control. This is also not far from the
2005 OECD average reported in OECD (2009), as discussed in the introduction. Fourth, we set the
share of expenditure on both tradable output (µ) and non-tradable output (θ) equal to 1/3. Moretti
(2010) and Faggio and Overman (2014) assume that only manufacturing is tradable, but this ignores
that some services are also tradable. In contrast, Lombardo and Ravenna (2012) estimate the share of
tradable sectors at the level of countries and report tradable shares in excess of 50% of employment.
Fifth, we assume that the iceberg trade cost for tradable output between the two cities (τic) is equal to
1.25, which is very similar to the average transport costs (excluding border-related costs and wholesale
distribution costs) of 21% of the value of goods estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Finally,
Saiz (2010) estimates a population-weighted average elasticity of housing supply in US metropolitan
areas of 1.75. We are interested in the inverse of this, i.e. the elasticity of house prices with respect to
population or employment in a city (γ), which we set to 1/1.75 = 0.57.12
Figure 1 shows the simulation results of a shift in public employment from city 2 to city 1 for
dierent assumed values of the amenity and productivity spillover parameters δ and α. The gure
has a number of striking features. First, the gure shows that the impact of shifting public sector
employment from city 2 to city 1 on private sector employment depends clearly on the magnitude of the
productivity and amenity spillovers in the model. With large spillovers, private sector employment in
city 1 across the tradable and non-tradable sector substantially increases in response to this reallocation
of public sector employment. In contrast, in the absence of spillovers (α = 0 and δ = 0), private
sector employment in city 1 declines so much that total employment in city 1 actually falls. Second,
if the population of city 1 increases in response a shift in public employment to this city, then we see
increases in both wages and house prices in city 1 relative to city 2. However, the increase in house
prices is quantitatively much more pronounced than the increase in nominal wages.
To see the intuition behind these patterns, it is best to break up the adjustment to a new long-
run equilibrium into a short-run adjustment, before workers can relocate across cities, and a long-run
adjustment when workers can move across cities in response to real wage dierences. In the short-
run, additional demand for labor from the public sector in city 1 has to be met by a reduction in
employment in the private sector of city 1. As consumers spend a constant share of their income on
12 We also normalize the xed costs F to one, which simply rescales the number of varieties and hence real wages across
both cities.
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non-tradable goods, this reduction in private sector employment will in the short run come entirely
from the tradable sector, whose output can be imported from the other city, while non-tradable goods
by denition have to be produced locally.
In the short-run, housing prices in city 1 and city 2, which are a function of the level of population
in a city, are unchanged. However, the increase in public employment and reduction in tradable sector
employment in city 1 relative to city 2 aect both nominal and real wages through several channels.
First, as more tradable varieties are now imported from city 2 to city 1 at positive transport costs, the
price index for tradable goods increases in city 1, which reduces real wages and hence utility in city
1. Second, this increase in the price of tradables softens the degree of competition in city 1, which
increases the nominal wage that tradable sector rms in city 1 can pay in a zero-prot equilibrium.13
Third, positive productivity spillovers to the private sector from the higher level of public employment
in city 1 directly increase nominal wages in city 1 as private sector rms can now pay higher wages
in a zero-prot equilibrium. Finally, positive amenity spillovers to the private sector from the higher
level of public employment in city 1 do not change nominal wages in the short-run, but increase the
relative utility of living in city 1 relative to city 2.14
In the long-run, workers are mobile across cities and will respond to the utility dierences that have
opened up during the short-run adjustment by migrating between cities. With either the intermediate
or high level of productivity and amenity spillovers from public employment to the private sector
considered in Figure 1, real wages and utility are higher in city 1 relative to city 2 after the short-run
adjustment to a shift in public employment from city 2 to city 1. This triggers an inow of workers to
city 1 that results in an expansion of production in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors of city
1. This inow of workers increases house prices in city 1 relative to city 2.15 How much house prices
have to increase to reach a new long-run equilibrium in which utility is again equalized across cities
depends on the degree of worker mobility. If there are large barriers to labor mobility across cities, then
a small increase in house prices is sucient to end migration to city 1 and restore utility equalization.
If there are instead no barriers to labor mobility, which is our baseline assumption, then the city with
higher real wages after the short-run adjustment experiences a larger inow of workers and a larger
resulting increase in house prices until spatial equilibrium is re-established. To what extent higher
wages or higher house prices therefore act as the dispersion force is a function of the degree of labor
13Higher wages in the tradable sector of a city also increase wages in the non-tradable sector and public sector of the
city due to the assumption of an integrated labor market in each city.
14In line with the wider economic geography literature, our model exhibits constant returns to scale at the level of the
sector despite the increasing returns to scale at the level of each rm. In a model where the private sector has decreasing
returns to scale, due to a xed factor of production in each city for example, a reduction in private sector employment in
a city would increase wages in the city also due to the increase in the marginal product of labor at this smaller scale of
production in the private sector.
15This increase in the size of city 1 relative to city 2 also has further general equilibrium impacts on wages across the
two cities. The larger city benets from better market access to due to more consumers being able to buy from its rms
without having to pay the transport costs, which further increases wages that rms in the larger city can pay in a zero-prot
equilibrium.
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mobility, where higher labor mobility results in a larger increase in house prices relative to wages.
In the special case where an increase in public employment has neither an impact on private sector
productivity nor amenities, our model predicts that private sector employment in city 1 actually falls so
much in response to an increase in public sector employment that total employment in city 1 declines.
This more than proportional reduction in private sector employment in the absence of productivity
or amenity spillovers would become a one to one reduction in private employment, if there were no
trade costs across cities.16 As discussed above, in the absence of productivity or amenity spillovers,
an inow of public sector jobs has two opposing eects in the short-run. First, less local production
of tradable varieties in city 1 implies that more varieties have to be imported from city 2 at positive
trade costs. Second, this reduction in local competition in the tradable sector increases output prices
and hence wages across all workers in city 1. This second eect is dominated by the rst eect so that
real wages in city 1 decline in the short run, which in turn triggers a population outow until house
prices in city 1 have fallen suciently to re-establish spatial equilibrium.
We have also simulated the model for the case of only productivity spillovers or only amenity
spillovers. Both types of spillovers have a qualitatively similar eects. Suciently strong spillovers of
either type in response to increased public employment in city 1 increase private sector employment
in the tradable and non-tradable sector of city 1. However, amenity spillovers have a larger positive
eect on house prices than wages, relative to the impact of productivity spillovers on house prices and
wages. This prediction of the model is similar in spirit to the classic Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982)
analysis.
In summary, the model illustrates how public sector employment aects private sector employment
through its impact on wages and house prices and also through potential amenity and productivity
spillovers to the private sector. The relative strength of these mechanisms is an open empirical question
to which we now turn. In Section 7.5 we return to the theoretical model and determine for which
parameter values it best ts the reduced form evidence.
3 Historical Background
In the wake of the Second World War, Germany was divided into four dierent parts: East Germany,
West Germany, areas that became part of Poland, and an area that became part of the Soviet Union.
Berlin, the pre-war capital of Germany, was situated approximately 200 kilometers to the east of the
border between East and West Germany. Berlin was jointly occupied by U.S., British, French, and
Soviet troops and divided into four sectors of occupation. The origins of Germany’s division can be
traced back to a wartime protocol that organized Germany into zones for the purposes of the post-war
military occupation. With the intensication of the Cold War, cooperation between the Western allies
16See Redding and Sturm (2008) and Handbury and Weinstein (2015) for recent evidence for the presence of trade costs
also for trade across cities.
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and the Soviet Union deteriorated and West Germany was founded in 1949 on the area of the U.S.,
British, and French zones, while East Germany was founded in the same year on the Soviet zone (see,
for example, Franklin (1963) and Kettenacker (1989)).
As part of the foundation of West Germany, a location for the new West German government had
to be found. There were four main contenders for the seat of government, which in order of their 1939
population were Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Kassel and Bonn. It was widely believed that Frankfurt was the
obvious choice for several reasons: It had been the seat of the rst German parliament in 1848; it was
the largest of the candidate cities; and it was centrally located in West Germany with good transport
links. However, on 10 May 1949, the West German Parliamentary Council (“Parlamentarische Rat”)
voted narrowly for Bonn as the new capital of West Germany. Of the 65 delegates, 29 voted for Frank-
furt and 33 for Bonn, with one invalid vote and two abstentions. This decision was conrmed by the
newly constituted West German parliament on 3 November 1949 with 200 votes for Bonn versus 176
for Frankfurt (Floehr (1986)).17 A popular myth is that Konrad Adenauer, Germany’s rst post-war
chancellor, single-handedly engineered this outcome, as he was of an advanced age and lived on the
outskirts of Bonn.18 The truth is likely more mundane. The heavy military presence of American
troops in Frankfurt was viewed as a disadvantage for an independent West German government.19
Moreover, making Bonn the capital of West Germany was viewed as a signal that the division of Ger-
many was a temporary arrangement that had to be overcome as soon as possible. While the new West
German government had its rst parliamentary session already in September 1949, the establishment
of a new federal government in Bonn was a long drawn out process, requiring the construction of new
buildings and recruitment of thousands of new civil servants.20
Despite hopes in the immediate post-war period that division would be short-lived, it was over
time formalized in international treaties and became widely believed to be permanent. West German
opinion polls in the 1980s show that less than 10% of the respondents expected a reunication to occur
during their lifetime (Herdegen (1992)). However, increasing dissatisfaction among East Germans led
to large-scale demonstrations in 1989 and culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.
Only eleven months later, on 3 October 1990, East and West Germany were formally reunied. On 20
June 1991 the German parliament voted in a narrowly by 338 to 320 to relocate the parliament and
17 The unexpected choice of a provincial town as Germany’s capital was widely ridiculed. The New York Herald Tribune
called Bonn in 1959 “one of the strangest capitals of the twentieth century”; the English envoys referred to the British
Embassy in Bonn as “Her Majesty’s only mission in a corneld” and a Newsweek correspondent was surprised to see
that his news bureau close to the federal parliament “faced a meadow on which a shepherd grazed his ock every Friday
afternoon” (as cited in Wise (1998)).
18 A common German joke at the time was that “If you say ‘A’ for Adenauer you also have to say ‘B’ for Bonn”.
19 Adenauer (1965) argues that this point was critical in swinging the vote in favor of Bonn.
20 While there is no reliable data on where the newly recruited civil servants in Bonn came from, the West German
government was keen to establish a new democratic administration that excluded people who were connected to the ruling
NSDAP party during Nazi Germany. While this was not always successful, as a number of post-war scandals revealed, the
establishment of Bonn is best interpreted as the step by step setting up of a new administration rather than the wholesale
relocation of government employees from Berlin to Bonn.
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parts of the federal ministries from Bonn to Berlin. Bonn was generously compensated for this loss of
status and economic power. This involved nancial compensation, the allocation of new institutions
of national and international signicance, and the agreement that every federal ministry would have
oces both in Berlin and Bonn and the majority of federal government employment would remain
in Bonn. After extensive building works, the German parliament and parts of each federal ministry
moved from Bonn to Berlin in September 1999.21
4 Data
Our basic dataset is panel data on employment in Bonn and a set of 40 control cities which were also
located in West Germany. The control cities are the 20 West German cities with a 1939 population
just above Bonn and the 20 cities with a 1939 population just below Bonn. Bonn itself had 152,057
inhabitants in 1939 and was the 31st largest West German city in 1939. The population of the 40
control cities ranges from 83,385 in Bottrop to 458,429 in Stuttgart in 1939. We have also experimented
with using a larger number of control cities but this has no meaningful impact on the results. Figure 2
shows the spatial distribution of Bonn and the 40 control cities.22 The dataset contains observations
from the pre-war censuses in 1925, 1933 and 1939 as well as data from the post-war censuses in 1946,
1950, 1961, 1970 and 1987. To make cities as comparable as possible over time, we follow Redding and
Sturm (2008) and aggregate settlements that had at least 10,000 inhabitants in 1919 and merged with
one of our cities during the sample period in all years in the data. A list of all aggregations is contained
in Section C.7 of the technical appendix.
Due to Germany’s federal structure in the post-war period, census employment data at the city
level is published by the statistical oces of the dierent West German states (“Länder”) while the pre-
war data was published by the Statistical Oce of Germany (“Statistisches Reichsamt”). We are able
to disaggregate total employment into 10 sectors (“Wirtschaftsabteilungen"). These 10 sectors have
been used unchanged in the 1961, 1970 and 1987 censuses. We use a concordance to aggregate the
employment data from the 1950 and 1946 censuses to the same 10 sectors. The 1933 and 1925 censuses
have also published employment data at the city level for a large number of sectors. We have developed
a concordance to aggregate this data to the same 10 sectors that are used in the post-war data. The
1939 census has only published employment at the city level in four sectors which are aggregates of
the 10 sectors. We use the 1933 employment shares in each city to disaggregate employment in 1939
in these four sectors into the same 10 sectors that we use for other years.23 Dropping the 1939 data
21 The extensive compensation and limited relocation of federal ministries suggest that this was a much smaller shock for
Bonn. Consistent with this there is no evidence for a change in the growth rate of population or employment in Bonn in the
years after 1999. We therefore concentrate on the much larger and cleaner shock of the arrival of the federal government
in Bonn in the wake of the Second World War.
22 We exclude the city of Saarbrücken from the control group, because Saarbrücken was under the rule of the League of
Nations from 1919 to 1935 and under French rule from 1945 to 1957.
23Sections C.1 to C.6 of the technical appendix provide detailed information on the sources for each year of our data and
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from the sample makes no dierence to our results.24
The 10 sectors into which we are able to disaggregate employment (and their 1987 German name)
are agriculture (“Land- und Forstwirtschaft und Fischerei”), mining and energy (“Energie- und Wasser-
versorgung und Bergbau”), construction (“Baugewerbe”), industry (“Verarbeitendes Gewerbe”), trade
(“Handel”), transport and communication (“Verkehr und Nachrichtenübermittlung”), nance and in-
surance (“Kreditinstitute und Versicherungsgewerbe”), other services (“Dienstleistungen von Unter-
nehmen und freien Berufen”), non-prot sector (“Organisationen ohne Erwerbszweck und private
Haushalte”), public sector (“Gebietskörperschaften und Sozialversicherung”). Agricultural employ-
ment is very low in our sample of cities and we omit it when we disaggregate total employment into
its sectors. Public employment in the 1961 to 1987 censuses consists of a narrow denition of public
employment that only includes employment in the public administration and social security admin-
istration. It does not include employment in the health sector and education, which are both part of
the sector “other services”, and also does not include employment in state-owned enterprises. Across
Bonn and the control cities the average share of public employment in total employment in our data
is just over 12% in 1987, which is not far from the 2005 OECD average discussed in the introduction.25
In addition to the employment data, we have collected a number of datasets to provide evidence for
the mechanisms emphasized by our model. First, we use data reported in Deutscher Städtetag (1988),
which contains a number of proxies for consumption amenities across the cities in our sample in 1987.
We have also obtain similar data for 1929/1930 for a much smaller number of proxies for amenities
from Deutscher Städtetag (1931). Second, we have collected data on gross value added per worker in
Bonn and the control cities from Gemeinschaftsveröentlichung der Statistischen Landesämter (1991).
Third, we use data from the Historic Employment and Establishment Statistics (HES) database (see
Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) for a detailed description) for 1987 that allows us to estimate individual-
level wage regressions. While comparable wage data does not exist for the pre-war period, we proxy
pre-war wage dierences across cities with information on payroll tax receipts in 1937 reported in
Statistisches Reichsamt (1941). Third, we have obtained data for 1986 to 1988 on the average price of
dierent types of real estate across a sample of West German cities from the Association of Real Estate
Agents (“Ring Deutscher Makler - RDM”). Finally, we use data reported in Deutscher Städtetag (1986)
on the number of hotel nights per capita in 1985 for all cities in our sample.
the concordance of sectors across years.
24 We also use a similar imputation to disaggregate employment reported in 4 sectors into 10 sectors for a small number
of additional observations due to missing 10 sector employment breakdowns for smaller cities.
25 As discussed in detail in Section C of the technical appendix, data limitations in the earlier years of our long time
series imply that the denition of public employment changes slightly over time. In particular, in the pre-war censuses of
1925, 1933 and 1939 public employment includes the military and the clergy and in 1950 it includes employment by the
occupying forces and foreign embassies. These changes in the denition of public employment obviously aect all cities
in our sample and any dierential change in public employment caused by these changes in denition should be small
compared to the large increase in public employment in Bonn due to the establishment of the West German government
in Bonn.
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5 Empirical Approach
Our basic empirical approach is a simple dierence-in-dierences comparison of Bonn and our 40
control cities:
Yct = γ + Tc + Tc ×Dt + λt + εct (11)
where Yct is employment in city c in period t and employment can be total employment or employment
in sub-sectors depending on the specication; Tc is a dummy that is equal to one for Bonn and zero
otherwise; Dt is a dummy that is equal to one after 1949 and zero otherwise; λt is a full set of time
dummies; εct is an error term. As we observe Bonn and the control group of cities for several periods
prior to treatment, we can assess whether the treatment city and control group of cities move in parallel
before the treatment. Whereas dierence-in-dierences comparisons are one of the classic approaches
to analyze natural experiments, there are two potential concerns with this approach in our setting.
First, as we only have one treatment unit (Bonn), it is particularly important to compare this city to
a control group that is as similar to Bonn as possible. Second, Conley and Taber (2011) point out that
clustering standard errors at the level of cities is likely to underestimate standard errors if there is only
one treatment unit in a dierence-in-dierences regression.
To address both of these concerns, we also construct a synthetic control city for Bonn as proposed
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). The
main idea of the synthetic control method (SCM) is to acknowledge that a simple average of other
cities may not be a good enough control, and instead to let the data speak and search for a weighted
average of cities that best mimics the pre-treatment trend (predictors) in Bonn. More formally, let J
be the number of available control cities (‘donor pool’), where J is equal to 40 in our application. Let
W = (w1, ..., wJ)
′ be a (J×1) vector of non-negative weights that sum to one. The scalarwj represents
the weight of city j in the synthetic Bonn. The synthetic control method chooses the weights W so
that the synthetic Bonn most closely resembles the actual one before 1949.
To understand how the weights are determined, let X1 be a (K × 1) vector of pre-1949 values of
K employment predictors for Bonn. Similar to X1, X0 is dened as a (K × J) matrix that contains
the values of the same employment predictors for the J possible control cities. We include in X1
and X0 both pre-treatment values of employment and exogenous covariates. In particular we include
in all specications the pre-treatment values of employment in the non-tradable sector, the tradable
sector and the public sector.26 These employment variables capture dierences in sectoral employment
patterns that may aect the post-treatment trend. As exogenous covariates that could inuence post-
war employment growth we include a dummy for proximity (75 kilometers) to the border between
East and West Germany to control for market access changes as in Redding and Sturm (2008) and two
measures of war-related destruction reported in Kästner (1949): the amount of rubble in cubic meters
per capita and the percentage of the 1939 housing stock that has been destroyed.
26We discuss in Section 6 below how we dene employment in the tradable and non-tradable sector.
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Let V be a diagonal matrix with non-negative components. The values of the diagonal elements of
V reect the relative importance of the K employment predictors in the construction of the synthetic
control. The vector of weights W is chosen to minimize the objective function:
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) subject to wj ≥ 0. (12)
The optimal weightsW ∗ that minimize this objective function clearly depend on the choice of weight-
ing matrix V . We follow Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and set V to be the identity matrix, which gives
equal weights to all predictor variables. Furthermore, we standardize all predictor variables to avoid
the pitfall that dierences in the units of measurement determine the relative weight of predictor vari-
ables.27 Alternatively, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)
propose a data-driven procedure to choose V such that employment before 1949 is best reproduced by
the synthetic control dened by W ∗(V ), i.e. the RMSPE is minimized over the pre-treatment period.
We have also estimated this alternative specication and nd very similar results with this approach
and our results are therefore not sensitive to the choice of V .28
The treatment eects α1t for Bonn in the post-treatment years t = 1950, 1961, 1970, 1987 are then
estimated as the dierence between Bonn and the synthetic control city:
α̂1t = Y1t − Y0tW ∗ (13)
where Y1t is the outcome for Bonn in year t and Y0t is a (row) vector with the same outcome for the
J control cities in year t. Since we use employment in the tradable, non-tradable and public sector as
our predictor variables no matter whether the outcome variable is total employment or employment
in one of our sub-sectors, the weights W ∗ do not change across outcomes. This is our preferred
specication as it ensures that the cities that make up the synthetic control for Bonn are the same
across specications. This also implies that the estimated treatment eects for the dierent sub-sectors
add up to the estimated treatment eect for total employment.29
6 Basic Results
In this section, we use both dierence-in-dierences and the synthetic control method to establish a
counterfactual for Bonn in the absence of the arrival of the federal government. We begin by looking
27 The standardization of the predictor variables is automatically carried out in the current implementation of synthetic
controls in STATA.
28 Kaul, Klößner, Pfeifer, and Schieler (2017) argue that using all outcome lags as separate predictors renders the other
covariates irrelevant. This concern does not apply to our procedure since using the identity matrix for V assigns equal
weights to all covariates.
29 Figures B.1 to B.4 of the technical appendix show results of specications where we do not hold the weights W ∗
constant across dierent sub-sectors, but use the pre-treatment values of the respective measure of employment as predictor
variables (along with our exogenous covariates). Doing so results in dierent weights W ∗ across specications with
dierent measures of employment as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, these alternative specications lead to very
similar results even though the treatment eects estimated for sub-sectors do not exactly add up to the estimated treatment
eect for total employment.
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at three outcomes: total employment, public sector employment and private sector employment. We
then further disaggregate private sector employment into its sub-sectors to examine the heterogeneity
of the impact of increases in public employment on dierent parts of the private sector.
6.1 The development of public, private and total employment
Figure 3 shows our basic results for the impact of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn on
public employment, private employment and total employment. The three panels on the left-hand
side of the gure compare Bonn (solid line) to the average of the 40 control cities (dashed line) in a
dierence-in-dierences comparison while the three panels of the right-hand side compare Bonn to
its synthetic control. The synthetic Bonn is a weighted average of the cities of Heidelberg (16.8%),
Kiel (0.2%), Koblenz (34.6%), Mannheim (4.7%), Münster (8.1%), Stuttgart (7.0%), Wiesbaden (25.4%),
and Wilhelmshaven (3.2%).30 Table 1 compares the similarity between Bonn and both the unweighted
average of the 40 control cities and the synthetic Bonn before the treatment. The table shows that
across the predictor variables, i.e. the pre-treatment values of non-tradable employment, tradable em-
ployment and public employment as well as our exogenous growth predictors, Bonn is more similar
to the synthetic Bonn than the average of the 40 control cities.
The closer t between Bonn and its synthetic control compared to the average of the 40 control
cities is also visible in Figure 3. Even though we use the same weights to compute the synthetic control
for total, public and private employment in Bonn, we nd that Bonn and its synthetic control track
each other very closely both in terms of levels and growth rates before Bonn becomes the capital of
West Germany in 1949. In contrast, Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities are not as close to each
other, particularly for private sector and total employment. Bonn has less private sector employment
than the average of the 40 control cities and the treatment and control group also have slightly dierent
growth rates. The same dierence between Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities is also visible
in total employment in years prior to the arrival of the federal government.
Comparing Bonn to either the average of the 40 control cities or the synthetic Bonn after 1949 re-
veals a number of striking patterns. First, public employment in Bonn increases substantially relative
to either counterfactual over the post-war period. While the new West German parliament already
meet for the rst time in Bonn in the fall of 1949 there is not yet any visible increase in public employ-
ment in Bonn in the 1950 census. However, over the next two decades public employment in Bonn
steadily increases relative to the counterfactual, consistent with the view that setting up a new federal
government is a long drawn-out process. Comparing the change in public sector employment in Bonn
between 1987 and the pre-treatment years to the same change in the synthetic control we nd a treat-
ment eect on public sector employment in Bonn of just over 15,600.31 When we compare the change
30 As noted before, we will use these weights for all subsequent sub-sector specications such as, for example, public
sector and private sector employment.
31 This treatment eect is computed as the change in public sector employment in Bonn between the average of the
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in public employment in Bonn to the change in public employment in the unweighted average of the
40 control cities, we nd a marginally larger treatment eect on public employment. Second, this rapid
expansion of public employment is not mirrored in an equally rapid expansion of private employment
in Bonn. Comparing the change in private sector employment in Bonn to the same change in the syn-
thetic control we nd a treatment eect on private sector employment in Bonn of just under 13,400
private sector workers. Comparing Bonn to the unweighted average of the 40 control cities instead
results in a larger treatment eect of just over 21,600 private sector workers, but this estimate seems
less reliable due to the much poorer t between Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities dur-
ing the pre-treatment years in terms of private sector employment. Third, as total employment is the
sum of public and private employment, total employment also rises rapidly in Bonn relative to either
counterfactual. The relative increase in public employment in Bonn is reected in the development
of the percentage share of public employment in total employment in Bonn, which increases from an
average of 12.1% in the pre-treatment years to 24.7% in 1987. In contrast, in the synthetic control the
percentage share of public employment in total employment increases from an average of 11.9% in the
pre-treatment years to 14.8% in 1987.
The results suggest that while the average of the 40 control cities and the synthetic control are two
quite dierent counterfactuals, they produce fairly similar treatment eects of the arrival of the federal
government in Bonn. The similarity of the results across these two very dierent counterfactuals is
reassuring as it suggests that the estimated treatment eects do not depend sensitively on the details
of how one constructs a counterfactual for Bonn. In what follows we concentrate on the results using
the synthetic Bonn as the counterfactual, which ensures the closest possible t between Bonn and
its counterfactual prior to treatment, but the results would be qualitatively similar if we used the
unweighted average of the control cities as the counterfactual for Bonn instead.
To illustrate the magnitude of the eects that we nd and to compare the results to the existing
literature we convert our treatment eects into simple employment multipliers. Dividing the treat-
ment eect of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn on private sector employment (using our
synthetic control for Bonn as the counterfactual) by the analogous treatment eect on public sector
employment, we nd that each additional public sector job in Bonn has created approximately 0.86 ad-
ditional jobs in the private sector by the end of our sample in 1987. This eect is substantially smaller
than the results in Moretti (2010) who nds that an additional job in the tradable sector of a US city
creates 1.6 additional jobs in the city’s non-tradable sector, with even larger multiplier eects for ad-
ditional skilled jobs. There are a number of reasons why the employment spillovers from additional
public employment could be substantially smaller than that of additional manufacturing employment.
For example, input-output linkages between the manufacturing sector and other sectors may attract
pre-treatment observations (1925, 1933, 1939 and 1946) and 1987 of 21,428 compared with the analogous change in the
synthetic control for Bonn of 5,791 which results in a treatment eect of 21,428 - 5,791 = 15,637. Other treatment eects in
this section are similarly computed.
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additional employment to a location while the public sector plausibly has much smaller input-output
linkages. Our multiplier is larger than the multiplier of 0.21 for total private sector employment esti-
mated by Faggio and Overman (2014) in their preferred specication, which is insignicantly dierent
from zero in their data. One reason for this could be that they estimate a short-run multiplier using
changes between 2003 and 2007. Consistent with this we nd a multiplier of 0.49 using our data up to
1960 and of 0.66 using our data up to 1970.
6.2 Heterogeneity across dierent parts of the private sector
The results so far show that public employment in Bonn has increased substantially after the arrival
of the federal government in Bonn while the increase in private sector employment has been more
modest. In this section we use our data on the breakdown of overall employment into 10 sectors,
discussed in Section 4, to examine the heterogeneity of the changes in employment across sectors.
The 10 sectors include agricultural employment, which is so small in all years of our data for Bonn
and the 40 control cities that we omit this sector. This leaves nine sectors, one of which is public
employment.
The simulations of our model in Figure 1 show that changes in public sector employment should
have a dierential impact on private employment in the tradable and non-tradable sector regardless
of the strength of amenity or productivity spillovers. In particular, as discussed in more detail in
Section 2.4, the impact of an increase in public employment should have a more positive eect on
employment in the non-tradable sector compared to employment in the tradable sector. The intuition
is that additional public employment creates additional demand for non-tradables, which can only be
produced locally even if local wages and house prices increase. In contrast higher wages and house
prices reduce employment in the local tradable sector, where the increase in local demand can also be
met by rms from other cities.
In Figure 4 we show the development of Bonn and its synthetic control across all nine sectors
without taking a stance on the tradability of the output of each of these sectors. The synthetic Bonn is
computed using the same xed weights as before which ensures that the treatment eects across the
dierent sub-sectors add up to the treatment eect on total employment. The gure shows that for
a number of the nine sectors there is hardly any visible treatment eect of the arrival of the federal
government in Bonn.32 However, there are also notable exceptions to this pattern. First, the nal
panel shows the large increase in public employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control, which
is just reproduced here from Figure 3. Second, the largest positive treatment eect on private sector
employment is in the sector “other service employment”. This sector contains a broad set of service
employment categories including employment in restaurants, hotels and theaters, business services,
personal services and hair dressers. Third, employment in the non-prot sector also experiences a
32 We examine the statistical signicance of the treatment eects across the dierent sub-sectors formally below.
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clearly visible increase relative to the synthetic Bonn.
To link the reduced form evidence closer to the model Figure 5 aggregates private employment
across the eight categories shown in Figure 4 into a tradable and non-tradable sector. The tradable
sector is simply industry employment while non-tradable employment is the sum across employment
in all service sectors (excluding public employment). While this classication is not perfect it should
provide a rst-order approximation to the tradability of dierent sectors. The gure shows that in line
with the predictions of our theoretical model the arrival of the federal government in Bonn has had a
positive impact on non-tradable employment while the impact on the tradable sector is much smaller
and actually negative in our point estimate. Converted into employment multipliers, we nd that each
additional job in public employment reduces employment in the tradable sector by 0.19 jobs while it
creates 1.05 additional jobs in the non-tradable sector.33
Figure 6 investigates the statistical signicance of the treatment eects across the dierent sectors
shown in Figure 4. This graph combines 39 placebo estimates for the cities in our donor pool (grey
lines) with the graph for Bonn (black line). Note that we plot 39 instead of 40 placebo graphs because
the city with the largest employment (Stuttgart) cannot be reproduced with any combination of cities
in our sample.34 Each line in this gure shows the dierence between a city and its synthetic control.
In addition to the 39 placebo graphs, the shaded area encloses the region between the 5th and the
95th percentile of the distribution of placebo graphs. In terms of public employment, Bonn’s post-
1949 development is more pronounced than that of all other cities. This provides strong evidence
for the uniqueness of Bonn’s development. Bonn’s treatment eect in terms of the non-prot sector
employment growth is also clearly statistically signicant. The increase in other service employment,
which shows the quantitatively largest increase in private sector employment is signicant in the early
post-war period, but is overtaken by two control cities in 1987. Finally the small decline in industry
employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control is entirely statistically insignicant with rather
noisy placebo treatment eects.
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) suggest an alternative way of estimating the statistical
signicance of treatment eects in a synthetic control setting by comparing the ratio of the root mean
square prediction error (RMSPE) before and after treatment. In particular, we compute both for Bonn
33A potential alternative explanation for the displacement eects in the tradables sector in Bonn relative to the syn-
thetic control could be changes in zoning away from industrial land uses towards public employment to create space for
government buildings and to reduce pollution from industrial production. This seems unlikely for two reasons. First, most
of the new government buildings in Bonn were built on empty land on the fringes of Bonn. Second, during the 1950s and
1960s, when we see the biggest treatment eects, Germany’s industrial production expanded rapidly and environmental
concerns about industrial emissions only became politically salient from the 1970s onwards.
34 This is a well-known limitation of placebo estimates and is typically dealt with by dropping the placebo estimate for
the largest member of the donor pool (in this case Stuttgart).
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and all placebo estimates the RMSPE before and after 1949:
RMSPE =
( 1
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)2) 1
2
p ∈ {pre, post} (14)
The intuition behind this is to contrast the t between a city and its synthetic placebo after the treat-
ment with the t before the treatment. A larger ratio implies a stronger treatment eect. The left-hand
panels of Figure 7 show this ratio for Bonn and all donor pool cities for the three sectors where Figure 6
suggests that changes in Bonn are statistically signicantly dierent from zero. The pattern visible in
Figure 7 is very similar to that in Figure 6.35
In another robustness check, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the composition of the
synthetic control group. The leave-one-out test suggested by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
(2015) focuses on the eight locations in the donor pool with a positive weight and re-estimates the
baseline model omitting each city with a positive weight in turn. The right-hand panels of Figure 7
show the result for the public, non-prot and service sector. The gure shows the baseline graphs for
Bonn versus the synthetic control group and the grey lines show the eight placebos where we leave
out one of the control locations with a positive weight at a time. The results are robust to these alter-
native ways of computing the counterfactual, which corroborates the observed similarity between the
dierence-in-dierences and synthetic control group results.36
Finally, while Table 1 shows that Bonn is very similar to its synthetic control in terms of three mea-
sures of war-time disruption a potential concern is that the remaining dierences could have aected
the development of Bonn relative to its synthetic control during the post-war period. To address this
possibility, we regress the employment variables for all cities in our sample on interactions between
year dummies and ve measures of war-time disruption. These ve measures are the three variables
used in our main analysis (the amount of rubble, the fraction of the 1939 housing stock destroyed
and proximity to the German-German border) and also a dummy for the Ruhr area, which was heav-
ily destroyed, and dummies for the three West German post-war occupation zones. We then use the
residuals from this regression as an adjusted outcome to construct a synthetic control for Bonn. As
shown in Figure B.1 of the technical appendix we nd very similar results when we compare Bonn to
a synthetic control constructed using the residuals from this rst stage regression.
In summary, in this section we have shown that comparing Bonn to its synthetic control over
the period from 1925 to 1987 reveals that the arrival of the federal government in Bonn after 1949
has resulted in a substantial increase in public employment. At the same time the increase in private
35 It is a rst sight surprising that the RMSPE ratio for public employment for Karlsruhe and Koblenz are nearly as large
as the ratio in Bonn. Figure B.6 of the technical appendix shows that the increase in public employment in these cities is
small compared to Bonn (and in the case of Karlsruhe likely driven by the establishment of the West German constitutional
court in this city) and is due to very small RMSPEs for these cities in the pre-war period.
36 Note that Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) also suggest an additional placebo exercise which would as-
sume Bonn became Germany’s capital in a period before 1949. Given the comparatively small number of pre-treatment
observations in our data it is not possible to implement this idea in our data.
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employment has been comparatively modest and has been concentrated in the non-tradable sector,
while industrial employment in Bonn has experienced a small but statistically insignicant decline. We
now analyze the possible mechanisms suggested by our theoretical model that link the development
of public and private sector employment in a location.
7 Mechanisms
The previous section has shown that in the wake of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn,
the city has experienced a dramatic expansion in total employment. However, this expansion was
driven by a large expansion in public employment, while private sector employment has increased
more modestly. In this section, we interpret this nding in the light of our theoretical model and
provide evidence for the mechanisms emphasized by the model. First, we provide some suggestive
direct evidence for the amenity and productivity spillovers from public to private employment that
the model postulates. Second, we show that proxies for long-term changes in wages are in line with
the predictions of the model. Third, we provide evidence that house prices in Bonn responded in the
way predicted by the model. Finally, we undertake a simple quantitative analysis of the model to see
for which spillover parameters the model best ts the reduced form evidence.
7.1 Amenity Spillovers
The two key spillovers emphasized by the model are amenity and productivity spillovers from public
to private sector employment. In this section we provide some suggestive evidence that there are likely
to be substantial amenity spillovers from public employment in Bonn. Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001)
discuss four consumption amenities in cities that they consider to be key to urban success. First, the
size and diversity of local services and consumer goods including restaurants and live performance
theaters. Second, aesthetics and the physical setting which involves the built environment as well as
the natural environment. Third, the quality of public services including good schools and low crime
rates. Finally, the speed of public transportation to facilitate commuting. While some of the these
amenities such as the natural environment are dicult to change, most can be changed through local
interventions.
Table 2 shows a set of simple cross-sectional regressions which compare Bonn in 1987 to the control
cities for a number of proxies for local amenities in the spirit of Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001). We
regress the natural logarithm of a proxy for local amenities on a university town dummy, a state
capital dummy and the natural logarithm of 1987 population. Across many of these regressions Bonn
has substantially higher values of amenities than the control group of cities. Column (1), for example,
suggests that cultural spending by the city of Bonn is around 50% higher than in the control group
of cities. Column (2) shows that total expenditure in Bonn is less than 10% higher than in the control
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group, so the substantially higher expenditure on culture implies a higher share of spending on cultural
amenities in Bonn. Columns (3) to (7) shed more light on the cultural sector. Columns (3), (4) and (5)
together suggest that Bonn has substantially larger expenditure on theaters, which are not driven by
a larger employment of actors, but by a higher wage bill. If higher wages of actors in Bonn reect
a higher quality of actors, Bonn staged better productions than comparable cities. Column (6), in
turn, suggests that these high-quality productions are not attended by more visitors, though. It is
also instructive to look at the number of artists more broadly. While theaters are generally publicly
funded, the number of artists comprises both those employed in public institutions and those who
are self-employed or dependent employees in the private sector. A larger number of artists in Bonn
in Column (7) suggests that Bonn oers a richer (or more high-quality) cultural environment overall.
Going beyond the cultural sector, Columns (8) and (9) look at medical provision. Bonn has a larger
number of doctors and a larger number of hospital beds than the control cities. Finally, turning to
schooling quality, for which we use the student-teacher ratio as a proxy, Bonn does not seem to stand
out in this dimension as we nd no statistically signicant dierence between Bonn and the control
cities. While these regressions are simple cross-sectional regressions, they provide suggestive evidence
that Bonn oers a substantially dierent set of amenities than other German cities of a similar size.37
It is unfortunately not possible to compile comparable pre-war data for the same set of amenity
proxies that we observe in 1987 and we therefore cannot compare the change in these proxies in Bonn
to the change in the synthetic control for Bonn. We have, however, been able to nd data for 1929/1930
for a smaller number of similar proxies for amenities before the Second World War. This data is shown
in Figure 8 which scatters the pre-war data for the number of classrooms in primary schools, the
student-teacher ratio, the number of theater seats and the number of theater shows against the 1939
population of each city in our sample together with a linear regression. The gure shows that across
all of these proxies for pre-war amenities Bonn was if anything marginally below the average of the
control cities. In particular it has fewer classrooms and somewhat larger class sizes than the average
city in our sample conditional on population. The number of theater seats and theater shows lies
almost exactly on the regression line. This evidence suggests that Bonn did not have better amenities
before the Second World War, consistent with the idea that the higher values of the amenities proxies
that we observe in Bonn in 1987 are indeed caused by the arrival of the federal government in Bonn
and are not due to pre-existing dierences between Bonn and the control cities.
7.2 Productivity Spillovers
We now turn to potential productivity spillovers from increased public employment in Bonn. It would
be ideal to investigate this question using rm-level productivity estimates for rms in Bonn and the
37In Table B.1. of the technical appendix we report the same regressions with all outcomes but Column (10) in per-capita
terms instead of controlling for the natural logarithm of population and nd qualitatively similar results.
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control group. Unfortunately, rm-level data to estimate rm-level productivity is not available for
the time under investigation, neither from national statistics nor from AMADEUS (a European subset
of the ORBIS rm database by Bureau van Dijk).38 In the absence of data that would allow us to
estimate rm-level productivity regressions, we present regressions of city level gross value added in
the industry sector and the trade and transportation sector in 1988 (Gemeinschaftsveröentlichung
der Statistischen Landesämter 1991) on controls for university town status, state capital status, the
natural logarithm of population and a dummy variable for Bonn.
The regressions in Table 3 show a clear picture. There is no evidence that gross value added per
worker in Bonn is higher than in the control group. Instead, we nd negative and statistically signi-
cant dierences between gross value added per worker in Bonn and the control group of cities in the
industry sector and an insignicant eect that is close to zero for the trade and transportation sector.
With the data limitations in mind, Columns (1) to (3) suggest that industry gross value added in Bonn
is between 27-39% lower than in the control group. For the trade and transportation sector, the un-
conditional specication in Column (4) suggests a 17% higher gross value added in Bonn than in the
control group but the size of this eect drops to close to zero and becomes statistically insignicant
once we add controls. Finally, when we combine both sectors in Columns (7) to (9), the estimated dif-
ference in gross value added suggests a 12-25% lower value in Bonn than in the control group. Given
the crude data and the lack of information about the cities’ productivity before the Second World War,
we cautiously interpret these regressions as suggestive evidence that public employment is unlikely
to produce productivity spillovers that benet private sector rms.
7.3 Nominal Wages
To investigate how the large increase in employment aected nominal wages in Bonn, we use a 5% ran-
dom sub-sample of wages from the Historic Employment and Establishment Statistics (HES) database
for 1987 and estimate whether wages in Bonn are higher compared to the control cities. The HES data
report workers’ daily wages, their industry and occupation, and socio-demographic characteristics
such as educational attainment, gender, age, and place of work. The wage information is very reliable,
since it is used to determine social insurance contributions. One drawback of the data is that wages are
censored due to the limit for compulsory social insurance payments.39 To control for this, we include
a dummy variable for observations where wages are top-coded. Alternatively, we have also imputed
the truncated wages following Gartner (2005). The data excludes civil servants and self-employed
38 To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study by Bernard and Wagner (1997) that uses plant-level data in
this time. However, the study is restricted to one federal state, Lower Saxony, and comparable data for other states is not
available before 1995. After that, the research data center of the federal states’ statistical oces provides access to some
ocial rm data (see Malchin and Voshage 2009).
39 This aects only 9.6% of the observations.
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individuals which are not covered by the social security system.40
Table 4 shows the results of the wage regressions. In Column (1), we present a bivariate regression
showing that wages are, on average, 2% lower in Bonn than in the set of 40 control cities. In Columns
(2) to (4), we add a number of control variables. In Column (2), we add experience and experience
squared, education, gender and a foreigner dummy. Additionally, we include interactions between
experience, experience squared, gender, education and nationality as suggested by Beaudry, Green,
and Sand (2012). In Column (3), we add dummies for 88 two-digit industries. In Column (4) we add a
control for the natural logarithm of income tax revenue per capita for 1937 in each city in the sample.
This variable controls for potential pre-existing dierences in income before Bonn became capital.
One can think of this regression as a quasi dierence-in-dierences regression. In Column (4) the
Bonn dummy is positive and statistically signicant suggesting that wages in Bonn were about 2.4%
higher than in the control cities.41
The remaining columns of the table consider further robustness checks. In Column (5) we impute
the truncated wages following Gartner (2005), which has minimal impact on the results. In Column
(6) we also control for the natural logarithm of population. In line with the existing literature the co-
ecient estimate for total population suggests that larger cities pay somewhat higher nominal wages.
The Bonn dummy becomes slightly smaller but remains statistically signicant.42 Taken together,
these results suggest that there has been a small increase in nominal wages in Bonn relative to the
control group of cities.
7.4 House Prices
We now investigate the extent to which house prices have likely responded to a change in employment
and hence population in Bonn. Recent work by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2019) exploits data
on individual land transactions in French cities to isolate the causal eect of an increase in population
on the price of land and, in turn, on the price of housing. They show that in line with the predictions
of standard economic geography models of the kind developed in this paper, an inow of population
increases housing prices in a city. Saiz (2010) provides similar estimates for US metropolitan areas.
Comparable data on house or land prices is currently unfortunately not available for Germany as
information on real estate transactions is held locally and not reported to a national database. How-
ever, we have been able to obtain data from the Association of Real Estate Agents that reports the
average price of transactions across four dierent types of real estate for a number of German cities.
Specically, the data reports the average rental price of new-build ats along with the average pur-
40 We also drop from the sample workers younger than 18 or older than 65 and we also exclude all individuals in training
and in part-time employment since there is no information on hours worked in the HES.
41 Using income tax revenue per capita for 1928 yields very similar results.
42 Note that the population of Bonn is by construction of the sample close to the average population of the cities in the
sample and the Bonn dummy should therefore not be substantially correlated with the population control variable.
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chase price of new-build ats, new-build semi-detached houses and new-build detached houses. This
data is far from perfect as it covers a subset of German cities that only partially overlaps with the cities
in our sample, only reports average prices and is unlikely to capture the universe of transactions.
Figure 9 correlates the natural logarithm of this data with the natural logarithm of population in
1987 for each city for which the Association of Real Estate Agents reports data (which is a somewhat
dierent sample of cities than our control cities) and also shows a linear regression. The gure shows
that there is a clear positive correlation between the natural logarithm of the dierent measures of
house prices and the natural logarithm of population. Bonn is close to the regression line for most
measures of housing prices reported by the RDM. Taken together this provides suggestive evidence
that the dispersion force of higher real estate prices emphasized by our model also seems to be oper-
ating in Germany.
7.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Model
We now undertake a simple quantitative analysis of the theoretical model to see whether the model
can match the key features of our reduced form results. In particular, we search for values of the
amenity and productivity spillovers (δ and α respectively) and the share of total public employment
located in Bonn for which the model can best match the reduced form evidence. In doing so, we
maintain other parameters of the model, such as the elasticity of substitution, at central values from
the existing literature. The simulations in Figure 1 show that, conditional on the other parameters of
the model, the strength of amenity and productivity spillovers and the share of total public employment
located in each of the two cities in the model uniquely determine the distribution of public and private
employment in our model. Intuitively, the distribution of public employment produces spillovers to
the private sector in the model and the strength of these spillovers depends on the values of δ and α.
These three parameters are identied using three moments in the data. The rst moment is the
increase in the share of public employment in total employment in Bonn relative to the synthetic
control city. As discussed in Section 6.1, the share of public employment in Bonn increases by approx-
imately 12.6 percentage points between the pre-treatment years and 1987 while the same change in
the synthetic control is just under 3 percentage points resulting in a treatment eect of 9.6 percentage
points, which we target in the quantitative analysis. The second moment is the increase in private
employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control. As also discussed in 6.1 this treatment eect on
private employment in Bonn is just under 13,400 workers. For the quantitative analysis we convert this
treatment eect into a percentage change to abstract from changes in the overall level of employment
in West Germany between the pre-treatment years and 1987. The increase in private employment in
Bonn between the pre-treatment years and 1987 is 63.9% while the same change in the synthetic con-
trol is 38.5%, resulting in a treatment eect of 63.9% - 38.5% = 25.4%. We target this 25.4 percentage
points dierence in the model. The third moment is the dierence in wages between Bonn and the
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control cities estimated in Section 7.3 above. The results in Column (4) of Table 4 show that wages in
Bonn are 2.4% higher than in the control cities after controlling for observable worker characteristics
and also 1937 dierences in income tax per capita receipts across cities. We therefore target a wage
dierence of 2.4% in the quantitative analysis.
The intuition of how these moments are able to identify the three parameters is as follows. The
change in private employment in Bonn helps to identify the magnitude of a combination of amenity
and productivity spillovers. If both of these spillovers are zero, then the increase in public employment
in Bonn would reduce total private sector employment in Bonn in the model. Similarly, a high level
of these spillovers would make Bonn more attractive for private employment resulting in an increase
in private employment. Second, the dierence in the share in public employment in total employment
between Bonn and the synthetic control city pins down the share of total public employment that is
located in Bonn, i.e the inequality in the distribution of public employment across cities. Third, the
dierence in wages across Bonn and the control cities identies the relative strength of amenity and
productivity spillovers. While both higher productivity and amenity spillovers from public employ-
ment increase wages and house prices in the city with more public employment, productivity spillovers
have a comparatively stronger eect on wages than amenity spillovers.
To determine the values of these three parameters we perform both a grid search and also use a
gradient solver. The grid search considers values forα and δ between -0.08 and 0.08 in steps of 0.002 and
the share of public employment in Bonn between 0.7 and 0.8 in steps of 0.01, which involves evaluating
72,171 parameter combinations.43 Table 5 shows the ten best t values of amenity and productivity
spillovers and the share of total public employment located in each of the two cities in the model. For
the best t parameters, the estimated productivity spillovers of public employment are negative but
close to zero, while the estimated amenity spillovers of public employment are positive. The point
estimates imply that doubling public employment in a city reduces productivity in the private sector
by about 0.4% while amenities in the city increase by about 1.8%. The parameter estimates are fairly
similar across the 10 best t parameter values shown in Table 5 which suggests that the objective
function dened by the three moments is well-behaved and has a unique global minimum.44 Finally,
we also use a gradient solver to determine the minimum of the objective function and nd values of
α of -0.0076, δ of 0.0211 and a share of public employment in Bonn of 0.7841, which is very similar to
43 In a rst step we evaluated a coarse grid with values of α and δ between -0.08 and 0.08 and public employment shares
between 0.5 and 0.9, which suggested that the global minimum of the objective function must involve public employment
shares between 0.7 and 0.8.
44To further examine how well these moments identify the magnitude of the productivity and amenity spillovers, Figure
B.7 of the technical appendix shows the objective function for dierent values of the amenity and productivity spillovers
holding the share of public employment constant at the value that minimizes the objective function. The gure suggests
that the objective function is well-behaved with a unique minimum. Furthermore, the gure shows that the sum of amenity
and productivity spillovers is very tightly identied, while determining the relative strength of amenity and productivity
spillovers is harder.
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the best t parameter combination in the grid search.45,46
Overall, the results of the quantitative analysis are consistent with and complement the reduced
form evidence on mechanisms. Both the quantitative analysis and the reduced form evidence suggest
that the increase in public employment has increased amenities in Bonn but has at best left productivity
in the private sector unchanged.
8 Discussion
In this section we briey put our key ndings in perspective and draw out some implications. Our
nding that the increase in public employment in Bonn led to moderate increases in private sector
employment, particularly in the non-tradable sector, is likely to be an upper bound on the multiplier
eects of public employment. The creation of a federal government attracts lobbyists, trade associa-
tions, diplomats and visitors. More mundane forms of public employment come without most of these
side eects and could therefore have smaller multiplier eects on private sector employment. This
could also explain why our multiplier eects are somewhat larger than the ndings of Faggio and
Overman (2014), which we discuss in more detail in Section 6.1 above.
There are at least three suggestive pieces of evidence that only a small part of the expansion of
private sector employment in Bonn is driven by by the wider impact of Bonn becoming the federal
capital. First, foreign diplomats in embassies in Bonn are excluded from our employment counts and
therefore do not mechanically inate non-tradable employment in Bonn. However, diplomats do con-
tribute to local demand for services in Bonn through their consumption expenditures.47 Second, our
results in Figure 4 show that employment in the non-prot sector, which includes employment in trade
associations and other lobby organizations, is quantitatively small relative to the increase in the cat-
egory “other service employment”, which contains classic non-tradable services such as employment
in restaurants, hotels, theaters, business services, personal services and hair dressers. Finally, to as-
sess whether Bonn has been a magnet for visitors, we use data for Bonn and the control cities for the
number of hotel nights per capita in each city in 1985. In this data, Bonn only has the eighth largest
number of hotel nights per capita, far behind the most visited cities in our donor pool.48
45 We used Matlab’s patternsearch algorithm and searched over α and δ between -0.05 and 0.07 and a share of public
employment in Bonn between 0.6 and 0.8. This involved 12,078 iterations to solve the system to a tolerance of 1.0e-7.
46We undertake the quantitative analysis in this section with our baseline model where labor is perfectly mobile across
cities. If we instead assumed that there are frictions to labor mobility across cities despite 40 years of adjustment, we
would nd even larger amenity spillovers and even more negative productivity spillovers. Intuitively, the model would
require larger overall spillovers to explain the observed increase in employment in Bonn, but to match the small increase
in nominal wages this increase in spillovers has to be biased towards amenity spillovers.
47As diplomats were excluded from both population and employment counts it is dicult to say with any precision how
many diplomats were stationed in Bonn. Chbib (2017) mentions contemporary local newspaper reports that approximately
3,400 individuals worked in diplomatic missions in Bonn in 1960, rising to 6,000 by 1975.
48The eight cities with the largest number of hotel nights per capita in 1985 in our sample are (nights per capita in
parenthesis): Heidelberg (5.7), Trier (5.3), Wiesbaden (3.6), Würzburg (3.5), Mainz (3.5), Freiburg (3.3), Lübeck (2.9) and
Bonn (2.7).
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Our nding that the estimated eect of increases in public employment on private employment
for Bonn is not very large even in the presence of the benets of becoming the federal capital suggests
that policies to relocate more mundane forms of public employment to support lagging regions may
not be very successful in stimulating private sector development. While a full cost-benet analysis of
such policies is beyond the scope of this paper, this suggests that such policies could be less eective
than advocates of such policies may expect.
9 Conclusion
This paper uses the creation of the West German government in Bonn in the wake of the Second World
as a natural experiment to provide evidence for the eects of public employment on private sector em-
ployment. Comparing Bonn to a control group of ex-ante similar cities and a synthetic control city, we
nd that the substantial increase in public employment in Bonn has only resulted in a modest increase
in private sector employment. Expressed as employment multipliers, the estimated treatment eects
suggest that each additional public sector job reduces employment in industry by around 0.2 jobs while
it creates just over one additional job in other parts of the private sector. We interpret our results in
the context of a simple theoretical model which allows for productivity and amenity spillovers from
public to private employment. Reduced form evidence suggests that the main mechanism behind our
results is an increase in endogenous consumption amenities in Bonn while productivity in the private
sector has at best been unchanged. A simple quantitative analysis of our theoretical model nds com-
plementary results. While the best t parameter for the estimated productivity spillovers of public
employment is negative and close to zero, the best t parameter for the estimated amenity spillovers
of public employment is positive and much larger.
More broadly our results contribute to the debate of whether changes in the level of public em-
ployment are a viable policy instrument to support economically lagging regions. As our natural
experiment involves the creation of a new federal government that natural attracts, diplomats, lobby-
ists and visitors our estimated eects should be an upper bound for the positive spillover eect that
additional public sector employment can generate in the private sector. Some of what we capture as
amenity spillovers could, for example, be driven by political economy forces that direct additional gov-
ernment expenditure on cultural amenities to Bonn. This implies that increasing the number of more
mundane types of public employment in lagging regions could have even smaller spillover eects on
private sector activity in the targeted regions.
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Table 1: Balancing Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiD Synthetic Control
Bonn Control B-C Control B-C
Non-tradable empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 30.910 35.885 -4.975 29.194 1.716
Non-tradable empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 33.854 40.578 -6.724 35.617 -1.763
Non-tradable empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 36.424 43.978 -7.554 39.645 -3.221
Non-tradable empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 30.111 33.317 -3.206 28.618 1.493
Tradable empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 20.502 30.084 -9.582 18.965 1.537
Tradable empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 20.375 30.287 -9.912 20.529 -0.154
Tradable empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 21.927 34.298 -12.371 22.055 -0.128
Tradable empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 20.621 30.680 -10.059 22.321 -1.700
Public empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 4.840 5.407 -0.567 5.509 -0.669
Public empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 7.000 6.060 0.940 6.165 0.835
Public empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 6.932 6.588 0.344 7.013 -0.081
Public empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 10.929 7.361 3.568 10.523 0.406
Border Dummy (within 75km) 0.000 0.125 -0.125 0.002 -0.002
Rubble (in cubic meters per capita) 7.300 12.240 -4.940 7.611 -0.311
Destroyed Housing (as % of 1939 stock) 37.300 39.950 -2.650 36.388 0.912
Notes: The table shows the balance of a set of predictor variables between Bonn and (i) the unweighted average of the 40
control cities (columns 2 and 3) and (ii) the synthetic control group (columns 4 and 5). These predictor variables are used
to determine the synthetic control group and they include the level of non-tradable employment, tradable employment
and public employment in all four pre-treatment years, a dummy for locations in proximity (within 75 kilometers) to the
German-German border and two measures of Second World War destruction (rubble and destroyed housing stock).
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Table 2: Proxies for Amenity Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of
Cultural Total City Budget Number of Wage Bill
Expenditure Expenditure Theaters Actors Actors
Bonn 0.553*** 0.086* 0.665*** -0.071 0.807***
(0.085) (0.044) (0.087) (0.118) (0.109)
Log Population 1.048*** 1.006*** 0.732*** 0.487** 0.612***
(0.115) (0.094) (0.136) (0.220) (0.180)
University Town 0.560*** 0.154 0.330** 0.144 0.392**
(0.117) (0.095) (0.127) (0.195) (0.162)
State Capital 0.005 0.102 0.188 0.116 0.225
(0.094) (0.157) (0.178) (0.181) (0.185)
Observations 41 39 33 33 32
R-squared 0.793 0.800 0.676 0.310 0.588
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of Logarithm of
Number of Number of Number of Number of Class
Theater Visitors Artists Doctors Hospital Beds Size
Bonn -0.026 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.281*** 0.022
(0.096) (0.082) (0.061) (0.048) (0.023)
Log Population 0.536*** 1.008*** 0.735*** 0.526*** 0.005
(0.169) (0.172) (0.075) (0.086) (0.035)
University Town 0.302* 0.863*** 0.394*** 0.440*** -0.094***
(0.160) (0.205) (0.080) (0.086) (0.027)
State Capital 0.182 0.240 0.222 0.081 0.073
(0.163) (0.238) (0.134) (0.094) (0.047)
Observations 33 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.491 0.698 0.836 0.761 0.238
Notes: All columns report OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of a city-specic amenity measure on a dummy for Bonn
and controls for the natural logarithm of population, a university town dummy and a state capital dummy. Dierences
in the number of observations result from missing observations for the city state Bremen with its two cities Bremen and
Bremerhaven (Column 2), missing information for theater outcomes in Solingen, Remscheid, Recklinghausen, Oenbach,
Mülheim, Ludwigshafen, Herne and Bottrop (Columns 2, 4, 6), and missing wage information for artists in Heidelberg
(Column 5). Artists in Column (7) include musicians, performing artists and graphical artists. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Figure 2: Bonn and the Control Cities
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Note: The map shows the location of the city of Bonn (square) and the 40 control cities that comprise the control group in
the dierence-in-dierences comparisons and the donor pool for the synthetic control approach.
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Figure 3: Total Employment and Private and Public Sector Employment: Bonn vs Control
Total employment (Di-in-di) Total employment (Synthetic control)
Public sector employment (Di-in-di) Public sector employment (Synthetic control)
Private sector employment (Di-in-di) Private sector employment (Synthetic control)
Note: The graphs shows employment in Bonn (solid line), compared to the average for the 40 control cities (dotted line
with circles) in thousands in the left-hand panel and compared to a synthetic control city (dotted line with triangles) on
the right-hand side. The upper graphs are for total employment, the middle graphs for public sector employment and
the bottom graphs are for private sector employment. In constructing Bonn’s synthetic control we use the same weights
across dierent specications which are: Heidelberg (16.8%), Kiel (0.2%), Koblenz (34.6%), Mannheim (4.7%), Münster (8.1%),
Stuttgart (7.0%), Wiesbaden (25.4%), and Wilhelmshaven (3.2%). See the main text for further details.
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Figure 4: Employment in Nine Sectors: Bonn vs Control
Note: The graphs show employment in Bonn (solid line), compared to the synthetic Bonn (dotted line with triangles) for
nine sectors: mining; industry; construction; wholesale trade; nance and insurance; transportation; services; the non-
prot sector; and the public sector. We do not display employment in agriculture as it is very small in the cities in our
sample.
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Figure 5: Private Sector Employment: Tradables vs Non-Tradables
Note: The graph shows the development of tradable and non-tradable employment in Bonn (bold line) and its synthetic
control (dotted line). Tradable employment is employment in industry, while non-tradable employment is the sum of all
service sector employment (excluding the public sector).
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Figure 6: Synthetic Placebos
Note: The graphs shows placebo treatment eects for 39 of our control cities (excluding Stuttgart as discussed in the main
text) and also the estimated treatment eect for Bonn (bold line). The placebo treatments are estimated by constructing a
synthetic control city for each of the control cities in the donor pool. There are nine placebo graphs corresponding to the
following nine sectors: mining; industry; construction; wholesale trade; nance and insurance; transportation; services;
the non-prot sector; and the public sector. We do not display agriculture which is very small as discussed in the main
text.
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Figure 7: Ratio Test and Leave-One-Out Test
Public sector employment (Ratio Test) Public sector employment (Leave-One-Out Test)
Non-prot sector employment (Ratio Test) Non-prot sector employment (Leave-One-Out Test)
Other service sector employment (Ratio Test) Other service sector employment (Leave-One-Out Test)
Note: The panels on the left show the ratio of post and pre-period RMSPE ranked by order of magnitude for Bonn and the 40
control cities. The panel on the right show employment in Bonn (solid line with squares), compared to the baseline synthetic
control group average for the 40 control cities (dotted line with triangles), and 8 leave-one-out specications shown as grey
lines. The upper graphs are for public sector employment, the middle graphs for non-prot sector employment and the
bottom graphs are for other service sector employment. In constructing Bonn’s synthetic control we use the same weights
across dierent specications which are: Heidelberg (16.8%), Kiel (0.2%), Koblenz (34.6%), Mannheim (4.7%), Münster (8.1%),
Stuttgart (7.0%), Wiesbaden (25.4%), and Wilhelmshaven (3.2%). In the leave-one-out specications, we omit one of these
locations at a time. See the main text for further details.
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Figure 8: Amenities before the Second World War
Number of school classes 1929 Student teacher ratios 1929
Number of theater seats 1929/30 Number of theater shows 1929/30
Notes: The graphs shows proxies for amenities before the Second World War against city size in 1939.
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Figure 9: Real Estate Prices and Population
Rent level for new ats Price for purchase of new at
Price for new semi-detached house Price for new detached house
Notes: The graphs show the natural logarithm of the average per square meter rent for new-build ats and the natural
logarithm of the average per square meter purchase price of dierent types of new-build dwellings scattered against the
natural logarithm of 1987 population. See the main text for further details.
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